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RESOLVING THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT




The clash between international trade regulation and environmental
protection has come to the forefront of international public interest in recent
years, fueled in large part by the Uruguay Round of negotiations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and some recent trade challenges, most
notably the Tuna/Dolphin GATT dispute settlement proceeding. In each of
these trade matters, trade rules or interpretations of them are being expanded
in ways that threaten the viability of environmental regulations. Moreover,
these trade developments are part of a trend in which the international
trade regime is reaching out to subject environmental regulations to its rules
and processes. Not surprisingly, the environmental community has expressed
outrage at seeing its hard-fought gains threatened by expanding trade rules.
The environmental community's outrage stems from the fact that exist-
ing trade rules and processes are not well suited to the nature of environ-
mental problems and regulations. Professor John Jackson acknowledges
that there is an imperfect fit, at best, between the trade regime and
environmental protections. Thus, he recognizes that if the trade regime is
to determine the vitality of environmental measures, extensive changes must
be made both to the governing trade rules and to the processes by which
such rules are developed and implemented.
Professor Jackson's solution, however, is to accept the preeminence of
the trade regime and to make relatively minor adaptations to it over time
to make it more hospitable to environmental regulations. In the meantime,
existing and anticipated environmental regulations will be subjected to the
trade regime, and accordingly may be undermined or derailed by the trade
rules. Ultimately, the adaptations that are made to the trade system,
assuming there are any, will likely not go far enough toward ensuring the
viability of much-needed environmental regulation. For these reasons, al-
lowing the trade system to subsume environmental matters within its pur-
view, in the hope that the trade system will adapt itself to be more hospitable
to such matters in the future, is an unacceptable course of action.
The trade and environment debate should begin with the fundamental
question-which Professor Jackson and many others associated with the
trade world assume away-of whether the trade regime should be the
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preeminent system to which environmental protections are subordinated.'
In addressing this question, the issue of process is key. For that reason,
this article begins by describing the normal context in which environmental
measures are adopted and implemented, and how the trade system offends
the notions of fair play that are the norm in that arena. Next, this article
discusses how existing trade rules and processes are stacked against effective
solutions to environmental problems. As a result of the biases inherent in
trade processes and rules against environmental measures, the preeminence
of the trade system over environmental regulations cannot be accepted, even
with the promise of the types of modifications suggested by Professor
Jackson. Instead, conflicts between trade and the environment must be
resolved in a neutral forum that is composed of both trade and environ-
mental government officials, and that has meaningful input from environ-
mental organizations.
I. TBE UNDERPINNINGS OF SUCCESSFUL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:
INFORMATION, OPENNESS, AND PUBLIC INPUT
An open regulatory system is essential to the development of effective
environmental regulations because such regulations are generally adopted in
response to scientific evidence of a problem and a public demand for action.
Moreover, historically few powerful economic interests with access to gov-
ernmental decisionmakers have had a stake in promoting effective environ-
mental solutions. To the contrary, such vested interests have often had a
very strong interest in thwarting such solutions, and have had the economic
and political power to have that effect. Yet, closed regulatory systems tend
to allow such economic interests to influence the process, while keeping out
environmental and other interests that lack economic clout. As a result,
environmental advocates have been most successful in forging effective
solutions to environmental problems in open systems in which they have
had (1) the ability to amass scientific evidence of the existence and nature
of the problem, and (2) access to the decisionmaking process.
The United States' system ensures the requisite openness and access
through several means. The public is guaranteed access to vast stores of
1. The assumption that environmental regulations are subject to the trade regime's
control pervades the GATT Secretariat's recent analysis of the intersection of trade and the
environment, see GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARI=S AND TRADE SECRETARIAT, TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1992) (advance copy) [hereinafter GATT SECRETARIAT], as well as the GATT
Working Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade, whose first tasks are to
review trade restraints in international environmental agreements and to consider transparency
of national environmental laws with trade effects. GATT to Focus on Trade Environment
Link, GATT Focus, Oct. 1991, at 1. The predictable opposition by the environmental
community to this assumption has been misinterpreted as being driven by isolationism or by
a desire to have an ineffective world trade system. John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and
Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227, 1252 (1992).
To the contrary, the environmental community objects to having its hard-won gains lost in a
system that has been developed by, and is answerable to, the economic concerns that often
have fought against those gains in the original forum.
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government information through the largely open and accountable lawmak-
ing process, through requirements that agency regulations and determina-
tions, as well as their rationales, be publicly available, 2 through the Freedom
of Information Act, and through the open meeting requirements of the
Government in the Sunshine Act. The lawmaking process is an open one,
with the capacity to amass volumes of information through congressional
hearings, research, and reports. Administrative rulemaking and adjudicatory
proceedings, which likewise develop extensive factual records, are a matter
of public record, as are court proceedings and decisions. 3 The Freedom of
Information Act enables the public to obtain information from federal
agencies, unless its release will cause the types of harm specified in the
Act's exemptions to disclosure,4 and the Government in the Sunshine Act
requires multiheaded agencies to hold their meetings in public.' These
procedural guarantees, particularly the Freedom of Information Act, ensure
that the public has access to final actions of agencies and the bases for
such actions, even where the actions involve international issues and pro-
ceedings.
The public is provided access to decisionmaking processes through
various means. First, through contacts with congressional representatives,
their staffs, or other congressional offices, the public can obtain information
about what actions are being proposed in Congress and can provide input
into the lawmaking process. Because of the prominence that environmental
issues have in the public's mind, many legislators are receptive to overtures
by environmentalists to seek solutions to specific environmental problems.
An interested legislator can obtain information from federal agencies about
the nature of a particular problem and the actions being taken or considered
to address it. Legislators can hold hearings to obtain additional information
from federal agencies or outside experts. They can also introduce legislation
to forge solutions or to curb undesirable federal actions.
Second, under the Administrative Procedure Act, the public is provided
notice of proposed regulations and an opportunity to submit comments,
which must be considered by agency decisionmakers in developing their
final regulations. 6 These rights extend to environmental matters with inter-
national implications. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency
sought public comment on its proposed rule implementing the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol).
7
Third, environmentalists may participate in agency adjudicatory pro-
ceedings and court proceedings by intervening and assuming party status in
the proceeding or by submitting amicus curiae briefs laying out their views.
While direct participation rights are obviously preferable, environmental
2. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)-(2) (1988).
3. Administrative Procedure Act §§ 3-7, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-557 (1988).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552b.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
7. 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 (1988).
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advocates may also submit expert opinions and other scientific evidence to
the parties to the proceeding. The parties may then submit the information
to the tribunal in support of their position. Because the underlying pro-
ceedings are public, interested outsiders can learn enough about the pro-
ceeding to make a meaningful contribution through these means.
Fourth, not only do these access rights enable environmentalists to
obtain information and to participate in decisionmaking processes, but there
are also safeguards against the undue, secret influence of countervailing
interests. Notions of fair play, embodied in constitutional protections, as
well as in ethics and conflict of interest laws, guard against government
decisionmakers having a direct, financial stake in the outcome of a pro-
ceeding over which they have control." Courts and most agencies also have
rules that prohibit secret, exparte contacts. In addition, the Federal Advisory
Committee Act establishes openness and balance requirements for federal
advisory committees, which in addition to requiring open meetings and
records also prohibit advisory committees from representing only one point
of view on the issues before them or from being unduly influenced by
special interests. 9
It is against this backdrop of access to information and to government
decisionmaking processes that environmentalists have had some, though
obviously not complete, success in forging solutions to environmental prob-
lems. It is also because of public access to normal decisionmaking processes
that recent Administrations and industry advocates have sought to move
their access and influence underground. Vice President Quayle's Council on
Competitiveness (Council) is the epitome of this effort. This body, which
is nearly identical in function and method of operation to its predecessor,
then-Vice President Bush's Task Force on Regulatory Relief (Task Force),
provides an avenue for industry input into the regulatory process behind
closed doors. Because the Council refuses to comply with the Freedom of
Information Act or public rulemaking procedures, it facilitates the type of
secret, ex parte contacts that are otherwise prohibited or sharply curtailed.' 0
This refusal also deprives the public of information regarding which entities
are making overtures to the Council and about what actions are being taken
in response. The Council and the Task Force have been receptive to such
industry input and have often delayed and derailed regulatory initiatives
that federal agencies had decided to pursue on the basis of public input
and public rulemaking processes." On the domestic level, the Council and
8. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988); 18 U.S.C. §§ 205, 207, 208 (1988); Ethics in Government
Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 401-408 (1988).
9. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 5, 10 (1988).
10. Public Citizen has challenged the Task Force's refusal to comply with the Freedom
of Information Act. A districtcourt ruled that the Task Force is an agency subject to the
Freedom of Information Act, but that ruling is on appeal. Meyer v. Bush, No. 92-5029, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13626 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1991).
11. PUBLIC CITIZEN, RISKING AMERICA'S HEALTH & SAFETY: GEORGE BUSH & THE TASK
FORCE ON REGULATORY RELIEF (1988); PUBLIC CITIZEN & OMB WATCH, ALL THE VICE
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the Task Force violate the principles of openness and access that have been
the bread and butter of the environmental community. The result almost
uniformly has been weaker environmental regulations that have been much
longer in coming than they otherwise would have been.
The trade system, both in terms of its international operations and the
way in which the United States participates in it, is at odds with these
principles of openness and access. Thus, the public is shut out of interna-
tional trade negotiations by the secrecy that pervades the negotiating process.
International trade negotiations are conducted in a far more secret manner
than international environmental negotiations, where drafts and alternative
positions are discussed openly, presumably because national leaders recog-
nize that they need to mobilize support for -environmental solutions and
that publicity is one way to do so. If the intersection between trade and
the environment is resolved in trade negotiations, the public will be kept in
the dark until the result is announced.
The NAFTA negotiations are illustrative. During the negotiations, the
countries refused to make public any draft agreements or summaries of the
status of the negotiations. When a draft text was leaked, the official reaction
was to deny the accuracy of the draft in light of subsequent negotiations,
rather than to include the public in the debate over its terms. 2 Moreover,
even after the United States Trade Representative and her counterparts from
Mexico and Canada reached a final agreement on the NAFTA on August
12, 1992, the Bush Administration refused to provide the public with the
terms of that agreement. 13 All that was made public in August 1992 was a
summary of the NAFTA prepared by the negotiators for public release and
the Administration's press materials. 4 In this way, the Administration was
able to present the NAFTA in the best possible light without enabling
anyone to analyze it and present a differing, more critical viewpoint.
Ordinary principles of openness normally guard against this type of one-
sided presentation of proposed actions.
One means by which environmental information about governmental
actions is generated and made public, including information about inter-
PRESIDENT'S MEN: How THE QUAYLE COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS UNDERMINES HEALTH,
SsATY & ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS (1991).
12. EC Negotiators Attack U.S. GATT Offer Exempting Key Sectors in Service Talks,
9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 516 (Mar. 25, 1992).
13. Letter from the Office of the United States Trade Representative to Public Citizen
(Aug. 19, 1992) (on file with author). In response to Public Citizen's Freedom of Information
Act request for the terms of the NAFTA, the office released the negotiators' summary and
refused to release any further details. Letter from Public Citizen to the Office of the United
States Trade Representative (Aug. 17, 1992) (on file with author). See also Sen. Moynihan
Says NAFTA Text Should Be Provided to Public, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1416 (Aug. 19,
1992); Gephardt Urges Bush to Reveal Details of Proposed North American Trade Pact, 9
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1567 (Sept. 2, 1992).
14. Governments of Canada, the United Mexican States, and the United States of
America, Description of the Proposed NAFTA (Aug. 12, 1992) (on file with author); White
House Fact Sheet: The North American Free Trade Agreement, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1424 (Aug. 12, 1992).
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national agreements, is through the preparation of environmental impact
statements. Such statements must contain an analysis of the environmental
effects of proposed actions and their alternatives. 15 They are generally
prepared in a draft form, which is circulated to the public for comment.'
6
The final statement, which responds to such comments, is then made
available to the public along with the final decision. 17 Federal agencies have
generally prepared environmental impact statements on international envi-
ronmental agreements before the submission of the agreements to Congress
for approval."
This is not the case with trade agreements. Neither the Office of the
United States Trade Representative (Office), nor its predecessor, has ever
prepared an environmental impact statement on a trade agreement. In
litigation over the Office's refusal to prepare such statements on the Uruguay
Round and NAFTA, the Office made it clear that it has no intention of
ever doing so. 19
While the environmental community is largely shut out of trade nego-
tiations, there is an elaborate system of industry advisory committees that
have access to information during the negotiations and that provide input
to the United States' negotiators.20 Until recently, none of these committees
had any representatives from the environmental community, and even after
the United States Trade Representative succumbed to political pressure to
appoint some environmentalists to its committees, only five of the more
than thirty such committees have any environmental representation. 2' The
Office takes the position that no such representation is legally required on
the other committees and, therefore, it has refused to make any additional
15. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
16. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502-1503 (1988).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.9(b), 1503.4, 1506.9 (1991).
18. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON RENE-
GOTIATION OF INTERIM CONVENTION ON CONSERVATION OF NORTH PACIFIC FUR SEALS (1976);
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES & CANADA FOR THE CONSERVATION OF MIGRATORY CARIBOU & THEIR ENVIRON-
MENT (1980); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON CONVENTION ON
THE CONSERVATION OF MIGRATORY SPECIES OF WILD ANIALS (1979); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON NEGOTIATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR ANT-
ARCTIC MINERAL RESOURCES (undated); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT ON RATIFICATION OF CONVENTION ON PREVENTION OF MARINE POLLUTION BY DUMPING
WASTES AND OTHER MATTER (1973); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE & EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT ON INCINERATION OF WASTES AT SEA UNDER THE 1972 OCEAN DUMPING CONVENTION
(1979).
19. Defendants' Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute 2, Public Citizen v. Office
of the United States Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139, 140-41 (D.D.C.) (No. 91-1916),
aff'd, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (dismissing case on ground that there was no jurisdiction
in absence of final trade agreement). A second case has been filed, challenging the Office's
failure to prepare an environmental impact statement on the NAFTA. Public Citizen v. Office
of the United States Trade Representative, No. 92-2102-CRR (D.D.C. filed Sept. 15, 1992).
20. 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (1988).
21. Membership Rosters from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S.
Department of Commerce (on file with author). These committees have over 800 members.
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appointments.3 The few environmental representatives that have been ap-
pointed are sworn to secrecy and cannot share what they learn on the
committees with others in their own organizations or in the environmental
community. Moreover, virtually all of the meetings of these advisory com-
mittees are held in secret and their records are uniformly withheld from the
public.23
Before an international agreement becomes binding on the United States,
it must be approved by Congress.Y International environmental agreements
are subject to congressional hearings and full congressional debate before
Congress decides whether to approve them. In contrast, trade agreements
are subject to fast-track procedures that sharply limit congressional hearings
and debate, require a congressional "yes" or "no" vote on the agreement
and the implementing legislation as they are submitted by the Administration
(meaning that no amendments are permitted), and require a vote within a
short time (fewer than sixty to ninety legislative days) after the agreement
and its implementing legislation are submitted to Congress.2s
The international trade system continues to be closed after a trade
agreement is put into effect. The GATT dispute settlement process is
illustrative. When a contracting party to the GATT lodges a trade challenge
with the GATT Secretariat, GATT rules and informal procedures cloak that
dispute in secrecy until the GATT Council adopts the determination of the
GATT dispute settlement panel. 26 At that time, the panel's decision is made
public. The parties to the dispute then generally make their submissions
available to the public as well, although they tend not to make their
adversary's submissions available without obtaining the submitter's con-
sent. 27 However, transcripts of the panel's proceedings are not made public,
even after the passage of time. 2 While this secrecy is mandated not by the
22. Letter from Joshua Bolten, General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
to Public Citizen (Feb. 3, 1992) (on file with author).
23. E.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 39,270-71 (1992).
24. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8; 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191 (b)(1), 2903(a)(1)(C) (1988).
25. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(c)-(g).
26. GATT Office of Legal Affairs, Suggested Working Procedures, 2-3 (on file with
author) [hereinafter GATT Working Procedures].
27. In Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, No. 92-656-
GAG (D.D.C. filed Mar. 18, 1992), the Office has described and defended its practice of
requiring the consent of its adversaries before making their submission public. The Office has
allowed for deviations from its general policy upon the agreement of the parties to the dispute,
which is what happened with respect to the submissions to the GATT panel in Report of the
GATT Panel, United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages (Feb. 7, 1992).
In response to numerous requests for the panel report, and Public Citizen's Freedom of
Information Act request seeking the United States' submissions to the panel, the Office refused
to release these documents until it reached an agreement with Canada to do so. That agreement
came before the GATT Council considered adopting the panel report. See Understanding
Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement & Surveillance, para. 15, GATT
Doc. L/4907 (Nov. 28, 1979), BAsic INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [hereinafter
BISD] 26th Supp. 210, 213.
28. GATT Working Procedures, supra note 26, 3.
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GATT itself, but by practice, it would be required to an even greater extent
by the actual text of the NAFTA.
29
The United States has extended this secrecy to its own submissions,
even though nothing in the GATT requires it do so. Thus, the United States
refuses to make its submissions to GATT panels available to the public
until after the GATT Council adopts the panel's report. In the Tuna/
Dolphin case, this secrecy prevented the public from scrutinizing, until after
the culmination of the proceeding, whether the United States was mounting
a vigorous defense of a key environmental law that was the product of
open, democratic processes domestically, but which the Administration
refused to implement until ordered to do so by a court. 30
As Professor Jackson points out, these rules of secrecy are often honored
in the breach."' Thus, the parties to a dispute may choose to publicize their
position for political reasons. Moreover, panel decisions are distributed to
all GATT contracting parties before the Council decides whether to adopt
them. Leaks at this stage, which are not uncommon, facilitate biased
depictions of the dispute and the panel's actions. In several recent disputes,
the Office of the United States Trade Representative has been able to
present its gloss on the dispute before the public or the press could obtain
a copy of the panel decision and evaluate it for itself. This type of spin
control for political advantage would be prevented by contemporaneous
public availability of official submissions to, and reports from, panel
proceedings1 2
The GATT dispute settlement proceedings are closed in another signif-
icant respect. Under GATT procedures, nongovernmental organizations are
not permitted to participate in the proceedings. Moreover, the panels are
comprised of three (and sometimes five) trade experts who are generally
well educated in, and supportive of, the GATT system, but lacking in
environmental expertise. As such, where a dispute concerns an environmental
matter, there is often" a need for scientific expertise that the panel does not
have. However, there is no mechanism for GATT panels to obtain such
technical assistance. As a result, such assistance thus far has been provided
on an ad hoc basis at best. 31 Moreover, because the proceedings are
29. North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2012(1),
available in LEXIS, GENFED-EXTRA Database; WL, NAFTA Database (awaiting ratification
as this article went to press) [hereinafter NAFTA].
30. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d
1449 (9th Cir. 1991). In Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative,
No. 92-656-GAG (D.D.C. filed Mar. 18, 1992), Public Citizen is challenging the Office's
refusal to make public its submissions to GATT panels at the time that they are submitted to
the panel.
31. Jackson, supra note 1, at 1255.
32. Affidavits of Lori Wallach & Robert Housman, Public Citizen v. Office of the
United States Trade Representative, No. 92-656-GAG (D.D.C. filed Mar. 18, 1992).
33. The World Health Organization presented testimony on the health basis for cigarette
regulation in the panel proceedings leading to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:
Dispute Settlement Panel Report on Thai Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes
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conducted in secret, and presumably most countries are like the United
States and do not make their submissions publicly available during the
proceedings, environmentalists are unable to provide information to those
governments -that are parties to the dispute or to the tribunal. Such infor-
mation might assist the parties and tribunal in obtaining a better under-
standing of the environmental issues. Because there is no procedure for
environmentalists to share information that pertains to a dispute, the GATT
dispute settlement system is poorly suited to resolving disputes over envi-
ronmentai regulations.
Aside from trade negotiations and dispute settlement, another disturbing
development in the Uruguay Round of the GATT and NAFTA negotiations
is the role proposed for the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), a
body administered jointly by two United Nations organizations, the World
Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization. In the
food safety sections of the 1991 draft GATT agreement, and the NAFTA,
food safety standards established by Codex would be presumed not to
impose unfair trade barriers, while food safety standards providing greater
public health protection than a Codex standard would have to meet certain
other requirements in order to pass muster.
34
The process by which Codex establishes food safety standards has
historically been closed to public health advocates and environmentalists.
Thus, government delegates have participated in Codex proceedings, with
the assistance of industry representatives, but until recently with no assis-
tance from the health or environmental community. Codex meetings at
which standards are debated and adopted are held in secret, and no record
of the proceedings is made public. Draft Codex standards are not made
available to the public until well into the process, and there is no mechanism
for the public to provide input directly into the Codex process. Instead, a
public health organization must persuade a governmental participant to
submit its position to Codex. When Codex obtains input from Codex-
established expert bodies, for example, on pesticide residue standards, that
advice is also developed in secret, but with extensive input from industry.
Moreover, there are no safeguards to ensure that the expert bodies are
balanced in terms of their perspectives on the issues, and that the participants
do not have undue ties to industry.
The process by which the United States formulates its position on, and
participates in, Codex matters is also contrary to normal principles of
on Cigarettes, 30 I.L.M. 1122 (1991) [hereinafter Thailand Cigarette Panel Report], while no
outside experts or interests presented evidence in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:
Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M.
1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report]. It may be more than a coincidence that
the Thailand Cigarette Panel recognized Thailand's right to regulate cigarette sales and
promotion for public health reasons, while the Tuna/Dolphin Panel found the tuna import
restrictions to be impermissible.
34. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Dunkel Draft];
NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 755.
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openness and access. As a general rule, the United States' positions on
Codex standards have been developed by governmental officials without the
type of public participation that is required when comparable domestic
standards are developed. In other words, there is no public notice of the
proposed standards and no institutionalized opportunity for public comment.
Instead, the principal avenue for outside participation in the development
of Codex standards has been the advisory processes established by the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). In the past, the agencies have solicited outside advice
in two stages. First, they have solicited advice from industry advisors on
the positions to be taken by the United States at an upcoming Codex
meeting. They have done this by providing industry representatives with the
agenda for upcoming Codex meetings, a draft United States' position, and
background documents on the matters on the agenda. The agencies have
thereafter convened a meeting (or meetings) of the industry representatives
for the purpose of obtaining their advice on the U.S. positions. Second,
the agencies have invited a group of industry advisors to accompany the
United States' delegation to the Codex meeting. These advisors have advised
the delegation on matters that have arisen during the course of the meeting.
The agencies have not (1) provided public notice of the committees' meet-
ings; (2) opened the committees' meetings to the general public; (3) made
the United States' position and background documents and the advisors'
responses available to the public; and (4) ensured that the committees had
a balanced representation. Indeed, uutil recently, the Codex advisory com-
mittees have been composed exclusively of industry representatives, ranging
from chewing gum manufacturers to the chocolate industry.3 5 These industry-
dominated committees that exert their influence on government decision-
makers behind closed doors run counter to the open processes by which
domestic food safety standards 'are developed. 6
As this discussion demonstrates, the clash between trade and the envi-
ronment is as much a product of process as of substance. If the trade
system operated more openly and provided more avenues for public input,
then there might be less opposition to having it dictate the viability of
environmental regulations. Of course, in a more open system, the rules and
35. TOM HILLIARD & PUBLIC CITIZEN'S CONGRESS WATCH, TRADE ADVISORY COMMITTEES:
PRIVILEGED ACCESS FOR POLLUTERS (1991) (describing domination of Codex advisory committees
by industry); Mark Ritchie, GATT, Agriculture and the Environment: The U.S. Double Zero
Plan, 20 ECOLOGIST 214, 217 (Nov./Dec. 1990).
36. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) was designed to prevent industry
domination of advisory committees. See H.R. REP. No. 1017, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972).
Public Citizen has objected to this violation of the FACA. See Letters from Public Citizen to
the FDA & USDA (Dec. 16, 1991) (on file with author). In response, the FDA, USDA and
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have begun to evaluate the process of United
States' participation in Codex. See 57 Fed. Reg. 29,462 (1992) (announcing p'ublic forum and
seeking public comments on Codex process). Also in response to public pressure, the agencies
have begun to invite consumer and environmental organizations to participate in the Codex
process, although this participation has not yet been institutionalized or otherwise ensured.
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interpretations would likely be much more hospitable to environmental
regulations. Environmentalists are unwilling to place the future of both
domestic and international environmental regulation in the hands of a system
which allows privileged access to economic interests that oppose such
measures, denies comparable access to environmentalists, has few mechan-
isms to obtain adequate environmental and health expertise for its rules and
decisions, and is virtually certain to delay needed actions for years and
possibly decades, until it can adapt itself to the task at hand.
II. THE TRADE SYSTEM EMBRACES RULES THAT THwART EFFECTIVE
SOLUTIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
The environmental community's objections to subjecting environmental
regulations to the trade regime 'stem not solely from the processes by which
trade rules are adopted and implemented, but also from the incompatibility
of existing and proposed trade rules with effective solutions to pressing
environmental problems. This incompatibility derives both from the diver-
gent goals and philosophies of the two regimes and from the particular
precepts that are embodied in existing and proposed trade rules.
Forty-five years ago, few, if any, of the drafters of the GATT could
have envisioned the types of environmental problems that plague' the world
today or the nature of regulatory solutions to such problems that currently
exist or are being developed at the international, national, and local levels.
As a result, the GATT was not drafted with these types of problems and
regulatory solutions in mind. Instead, it was designed to address interna-
tional economic problems that were largely divorced in most people's minds
from health and environmental considerations. The first decades under the
GATT continued this focus on tariffs and other strictly economic measures.
It is in this context of economic regulation, with little thought given to
health and environmental regimes, that the GATT rules, interpretations,
and dispute settlement procedures evolved.
When GATT negotiations and* trade challenges began to focus in recent
years on health and environmental measures such as nontariff trade barriers,
it was from a trade perspective that viewed such measures with great
suspicion and even hostility. As Professor Jackson states, "[a]ll too often
during the past decade, it has appeared that the trade policy specialists have
feared the incursion of environmental policies on their terrain (partly because
the environmental policies can be so easily used as an excuse for protec-
tionism) .... "37
The trade experts tend to view health and environmental measures that
restrict trade as undesirable because they impede trade, regardless of the
particular reasons for, and context of, the measures. From the trade
perspective, the goal in negotiations and trade disputes is to curtail such
measures or, where that is not possible, to limit them to the bare minimum
37. Jackson, supra note 1, at 1235.
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necessary to serve what the trade world deems are legitimate purposes and
through what the trade world concludes are acceptable means.38
This goal derives from the general philosophy behind the trade regime-
that a free market economy will make the world better off. While this
philosophy has historically been couched in terms of economic well-being,
it has more recently become the rallying cry for free traders seeking to
defend the expansion of the trade system into the environmental arena.
Thus, the argument goes, trade liberalization will make countries better able
to afford costly environmental protections.39 This argument ignores the fact
that the trade rules promote certain behaviors that are harmful to the
environment and stand in the way of government actions to curtail such
behaviors. As a result, the issue is not limited to the effectiveness of
government actions to rectify environmental problems, which would be
enhanced by the availability of more government resources for that purpose.
Rather, the focus should be first and foremost on understanding the types
of environmentally harmful behaviors that will be promoted by the trade
system and the solutions that will be prohibited by it.
A. The Trade Rules Do Not Account For Environmental Externalities
Under the international trade system, the societal costs of the environ-
mental impacts and of the consumption of natural resources are not borne
by the producer, and are thus not reflected in market prices. In economic
terms, the costs of these impacts are said to be "externalized." While it is
possible that the trade regime could require the internalization of such
external costs of production, the current trade system makes no such
accommodation. As a result, pollution and other environmentally harmful
by-products of market behavior are permitted without any market adjust-
ments, and government actions taken to curtail or account for such exter-
nalities are often considered restraints of trade.40
The trade system could be redesigned to encourage the full 'accounting
or internalization of such costs by attributing the societal costs of pollution
to the polluting activity.4' A government's failure to regulate the activity so
that market prices reflect these costs would be an impermissible government
subsidy that would be actionable under the GATT. An importing country
38. See id. at 1228, 1231.
39. GATT SECRETARIAT, supra note 1, at 1, 6; Jackson, supra note 1, at 1228, 1255-56.
40. Aside from the general problem of externalities, the terms of recent trade agreements
create specific incentives for environmentally harmful behavior. For example, the United States-
Canada Free Trade Agreement insulates government subsidies for oil and gas exploration and
development from attack under the Agreement, but affords no such protection to subsidies
and other programs designed to encourage energy efficiency and conservation. Free Trade
Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., art. 906, 27 I.L.M. 293, 344 [hereinafter FTA]. The
NAFTA contains identical provisions. NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 608(2).
41. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE POLLUTER
PAYS PRINCIPLE: DEFINITION ANALYSIS IMPLEMENTATION (1975).
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could then impose countervailing duties on imports from that country,
equivalent to those adverse environmental impacts. This type of system
would eliminate the competitive advantage that otherwise accompanies weak
environmental regulation. It would therefore obviate the need for trade
restrictive measures to protect domestic industries that internalize such costs
from competition from industries that do not.
42
Since the trade system currently does not require the internalization of
environmental impacts, and is not moving towards doing so in the near
future, it penalizes industries that internalize such costs and leaves govern-
ments no effective means to combat any competitive disadvantage faced by
industries that bear such costs. 43 Thus, if a country wants to maintain tough
pollution control standards and still preserve its competitiveness, it must
either subsidize the costs of complying with such standards or establish
import tariffs to ensure that imports from other countries without compa-
rable standards do not gain an unfair competitive advantage. However, the
GATT prohibitions on government subsidies and differential import tariffs
do not permit these adjustments. The GATT prohibition on discrimination
between like products based on a variation in the method of production
also stands in the way of market corrections for differing degrees of
internalization of the environmental costs of production.
Similarly, the current trade system is hostile towards efforts to promote
sustainable development, in large part because the consumption of natural
resources is not factored into market prices. As a result, the means by
which governments may promote sustainable development, for example,
subsidies or other protections for domestic industries that use sustainable
development practices or import restrictions on products produced through
unsustainable means, are trade restrictions that run afoul of the GATT.
The most effective reform of the existing trade system would be to
require the internalization of environmental costs. 44 If this reform were
made, countries would have less need to resort to trade restrictive measures.
However, in the absence of this reform, a whole series of lesser reforms is
essential. Thus, government subsidies that promote environmentally bene-
ficial behavior should hot be actionable under the GATT. Furthermore,
trade measures in the form of import tariffs or other import restrictions
42. It may be necessary to provide some funding for environmental regulation in
developing countries to ease the transition to a system that internalizes all costs of production.
43. The disparities in environmental regulation between Mexico and the United States
have given rise to serious concerns that the NAFTA will cause industries to relocate to Mexico
in order to evade more stringent U.S. standards. Indeed, in a General Accounting Office
survey, 78% of wood furniture manufacturing operations that relocated from the Los Angeles
area to Mexico identified California's stringent air pollution control standards as a major
factor in their decision to relocate. U.S. GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, U.S.-MExIco TRADE:
SOME U.S. WOOD FuiruTURE FitMs RELOCATED FROM Los ANGELES AREA TO MEXICO 4 (1991).
44. Developing countries have a legitimate objection to reform that would internalize
environmental costs because developed countries obtained a competitive advantage over time
by externalizing environmental costs. For this reason, it may be necessary to provide financial
assistance to developing countries in meeting the demands of this reform.
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that penalize environmentally harmful production processes should be per-
mitted.
The existing trade regime does not embrace the concept of internaliza-
tion, nor is it likely to do so. However, the trade and environment debate
must necessarily confront this issue. If it is ignored or assumed away, the
trade system will never be able to command full legitimacy as the system
that should resolve conflicts between trade and the environment. The only
way to resolve this issue in a way that has a chance of satisfying, or at
least appeasing, advocates of the various points of view is to ensure that it
is fully debated and resolved on an even playing field. Because the trade
system has already staked out its position, it is far from neutral and
therefore cannot be the forum for debating and resolving this issue.
B. The Trade System Discounts Unilateral Environmental Actions
Another significant issue in the trade and environment debate is the
extent to which one country, or a group of countries, may impose restraints
on trade to address an environmental problem outside their borders. Again,
the trade regime is not neutral on this issue, but instead views unilateral
environmental actions as suspect. Thus, in the Tuna/Dolphin dispute, the
GATT panel concluded that cooperative international arrangements should
be pursued before trade restrictions may be imposed.45 Similarly, the Uru-
guay Round and the NAFTA food safety provisions make it clear that
countries may not restrict trade in order to protect health or life outside
their borders. 46
This prohibition on the extraterritorial reach of environmental regula-
tions is devastating because many environmental problems extend behind
national borders. Where an industrial activity in one country produces
environmental damage in another, the recipient of the harm may seek to
curb the behavior causing that harm. Canada's attempt to compel the
United States to take action to lessen acid rain provides a case in point.
To be effective, most such efforts would need to focus on production
processes, rather than final products, and thus they would discriminate
against like products in violation of the GATT. However, if the trade
system ties Canada's hands, then free trade in acid rain is assured. In other
words, United States industries are permitted to externalize the environmen-
tal cost of production at Canada's expense. Canada should be able to
correct the flaws in the market that derive from the U.S. market's failure
to require the internalization of these costs.
The market's imperfections are exacerbated with respect to the global
commons, such as the atmosphere and the global climate, that are shared
by all. Significant disincentives stand in the way of national regulation
because of the problems presented by holdouts (those refusing to cooperate)
45. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 33, paras. 6.2-.3, at 1622-23.
46. Dunkel Draft, supra note 34, § L, at L.1-.74; NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 754(l).
1292
1992] A NEUTRAL FORUM AND NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES
and free-riders (those refusing to share the costs of regulation). In the face
of the externalization of the environmental costs of production, countries
may forgo regulations that protect the global commons in order to gain a
competitive advantage.
Extraterritorial regulation by countries willing to take the lead in such
regulation may shift the balance and force other countries to follow suit.
It also may be the only way to obtain any degree of cooperation among
countries willing to act. For example, the 'Montreal Protocol imposes dif-
ferent trade restriction on developed and developing countries, and it restricts
trade not only in Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) products but also in products
produced through processes that utilize CFCs.47 These trade restrictions
extend to trade with nonparties, as well as parties, to the Montreal Protocol.
Without incentives for developing countries and provisions preventing non-
parties from picking up the slack in CFC trade and gaining a competitive
advantage from retaining CFC processes and products, the Montreal Pro-
tocol would neither gain wide support,' nor lead to effective solutions.
Extraterritorial regulation is also critical in protecting endangered and
threatened species. Although there are many international conventions pro-
tecting endangered species, the enforcement mechanisms are generally in-
effective or nonexistent. Thus, the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES)4S allows any country to enter a reservation to
a change in the list of protected species and thereby to exempt itself from
the Convention with respect to that species. Various United States laws
impose trade bans on such species, and sometimes also on trade in products
caught by methods that threaten such species, in order to give teeth to
CITES and other international conventions and to place political pressure
on the offending countries. Without this tool, economic self-interest will be
left unchecked and perpetuate the cycle of endangerment.
49
Even where a resource is located within the territorial boundaries of a
country, such as a rain forest or an elephant herd, depletion of that resource
has consequences for the international environment, for example, by con-
tributing to global warming or threatening to extinguish a species or reduce
biodiversity. A ban on imports of tropical hardwood or elephant ivory
products may be the most effective way to prevent deforestation of rain
forests or elephant extinction.
Given that actions must be taken at critical points to prevent environ-
mental problems from worsening or becoming irreversible, extraterritorial
environmental regulation is an important, if not an essential, tool. This is,
47. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, art.
4, 26 I.L.M. 1550, 1554-55 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
48. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
49. Threatened trade sanctions have been identified as the reason why Japan phased out
imports of hawksbill turtle shells, and as causing other countries to change shrimping practices
to protect sea turtles. U.S. CoNGREsS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TRADE AND ENVi-
RONMENT: CONFLICT AND OppoRTuNrrIEs 75 (1992) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
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also why it is sometimes necessary for countries to adopt such measures
before an international consensus emerges. Requiring an international con-
sensus is likely to lead to lowest common denominator solutions because
environmental costs are externalized in the absence of some corrective action
and because of holdout and free-rider problems. To make matters worse,
even a lowest common denominator solution may be long in coming in the
absence of some pressure from extraterritorial regulation. Given the need
to take swift action in response to many environmental problems, many
people feel that there is an overriding need to move ahead of the existing
international consensus.
Even if environmental trade restrictions are limited to those supported
by some sort of international consensus, there are likely to be disagreements
as to when an international consensus has emerged. Staking out a rather
extreme position, the trade system has exhibited extreme reluctance to
acknowledge any international consensus on trade-restrictive environmental
measures. Thus, the Montreal Protocol and CITES command substantial
international support, yet further action in the form of a waiver is necessary
before GATT will recognize them. Similarly, even though the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) endorsed the polluter
pays principle in 1972, the trade world does not recognize that principle as
a valid international consensus. Moreover, where there is an international
consensus as to the existence of a problem and the need for a trade-
restrictive remedy, the trade world may still refuse to accept the legitimacy
of that remedy either because it is not mandated by the letter of an
international agreement, as in the case of a CITES reservation, or because
it is not the least restrictive way to address the problem. 0
The extent to which unilateral trade restrictions may be imposed for
environmental purposes is a burning issue in the trade and the environment
debate. The trade regime has already come out against unilateral, extraterri-
torial environmental measures. For this reason, it is not a neutral forum in
which to air and resolve this issue.
C. GATT's Health And Natural Resources Exceptions Thwart Needed
Environmental Regulation
The clash between the trade system and environmental regulation could
be alleviated if the trade rules contained exceptions to their prohibitions on
trade restraints for environmental regulations. The GATT, in fact, contains
two exceptions that could, in theory, serve this purpose: an exception for
measures that are "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health
.. "51 and another for measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption .... "52
50. See NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 104(1).
51. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX(b), 61 Stat. All,
A61, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 262 [hereinafter GATT].
52. Id. art. XX(g), 61 Stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
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These exceptions have been construed in such a way that they do not
afford sufficient protection to necessary environmental regulations, which is
not surprising given that they have been interpreted and implemented in closed
trade processes by trade, not environmental or public health, experts who tend
to view environmental regulations as inherently protectionist. 3 Especially trou-
bling is the fact that the trade world will determine whether a particular
measure serves legitimate health or environmental goals, and whether it does
so-through acceptable means.
In the Uruguay Round, elaborate standards are being developed to distin-
guish between legitimate and illegitimate food safety and technical standards.
Under these provisions, certain international standards (that often are often
not the most protective of health or the environment) would be deemed to be
legitimate' 4 Standards that provide more protection to public health or the
environment would need to pass muster under a sound science test. As stated
in the latest Uruguay Round draft, a country maintaining such a food safety
standard would need to show that there is a scientific justification for the
standard and that it is not maintained in the face of contrary scientific
evidence.55 The draft also spells out other requirements for such standards,
such as that food safety standards must be based on risk-benefit analyses and
that technical standards must be performance, rather than design or product,
standards.
56
The notion of a country being forced to present the scientific justification-
for its actions to a GATT dispute settlement panel that lacks scientific expertise
is troubling, particularly because there is rarely certain scientific evidence. In
the face of scientific uncertainty of an environmental problem and the likeli-
hood that it will worsen significantly unless prompt action is taken, many
governments will decide to take action based on their political assessment of
the situatfon and risks. One illustration of this proposition is provided by the
Delaney Clauses of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which prohibit
the introduction of certain carcinogens into foods. 7 These prohibitions were
adopted by Congress more than thirty years ago, based on its policy deter-
53. The health and natural resources exceptions to the GATT's prohibitions are "[s]ubject
to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade." Id. art. XX; 61 Stat. at A60-61, 55
U.N.T.S. at 262.
54. Dunkel Draft, supra note 34, § L, paras. 9-10, at L.37; id. § G, para. 2.4, at G.3.
55. Id. § L, para. 6, at L.36; id. § L, para. 11, at L.37; id. §'L, para. 20, at L.38. It
would not be enough that a country adopted a measure in response to consumer demands in
the face of lack of scientific certainty, which was one of the defenses offered for the European
Community's ban on hormone-treated beef. Id. § L, at L.35; OTA REPORT, supra note 48,
at 86-87.
While a country may maintain a more protective standard if it consistently affords one .
higher level of protection, that degree of consistency is difficult to achieve in practice. Dunkel
Draft, supra note 34, § L, para. 11, at L.37; id. § L, para. 20, at L.38.
56. Id. § L, paras. 16-18, 20, at L.38; id. § G, para. 2.8, at 0.3.
57. 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c)(3)(A), 376(b)(2)(B) (1988).
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mination that cancer-causing substances should not be added to the food
supply. Science as we know it today had little to do with that decision. Indeed,
industry advocates argue that the Delaney Clauses are outmoded, while con-
sumer and public health advocates continue to support them.
The other significant limitation imposed by trade rules on health and
environmental standards is the requirement that such standards must use the
available means that are least restrictive to trade.s However, as a general rule,
the most effective solutions to environmental problems will be more restrictive
to trade than the less effective alternatives. For example, it could almost
always be argued that it is less restrictive to trade to require disclosures of
the adverse health or environmental effects of a product than it would be to
ban the product, but a ban is unquestionably a more effective environmental
solution.
By mandating the use of alternatives that are the least restrictive to trade,
the trade system is stacked against effective environmental regulation. Thus,
if a country seeks to create incentives for reusable containers by taxing
disposable containers and, to a lesser extent, recyclable ones, it could open
itself up to a trade challenge, particularly if it has already shifted its own use
to reusable containers. The tax, though nondiscriminatory on its face, would
be viewed as protectionist because it favors the domestic industry that uses
the more environmentally friendly containers. The measure would also be
subject to scrutiny under the GATT for a determination of whether the taxes
are disproportional to the environmental harm caused by the disposable and
recyclable containers, respectively. And of course, trade experts who tend to
see protectionism in virtually all environmental regulations would determine
whether the measure employed the least restrictive means of achieving a
legitimate goal.
Existing trade rules against which health and environmental standards are
measured are, like the trade system's failure to internalize environmental costs,
and its presumptions against unilateral measures, stacked against effective
health and environmental regulations. Especially in light of the processes for
developing and implementing these rules, they are far from neutral. As such,
they are an inappropriate backdrop or starting point for the debate over when
health and environmental measures may impose restrictions on trade.
III. THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT DEBATE MUST BE RESOLVED IN A
NEUTRAL FoRM
Because the current trade regime does not embody the polluter pays
principle and other environmentally friendly concepts, world trade rules will
58. Report of the GATT Panel, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
para. 5.26, GATT Doc. L/6439 (Nov. 7, 1989), BISD 36th Supp. 345, 392-93; Thailand
Cigarette Panel Report, supra note 33; Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 33, at 1623;
Report of the GATT Panel, Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring
and Salmon, para. 4.6, GATT Doc. L/6268 (Mar. 22, 1988), BISD 35th Supp. 98, 114; see
also Dunkel Draft, supra note 34, § L, para. 6, at L.36; id. § L, para. 21, at L.39.
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allow environmental problems to worsen as a normal consequence of market
activity. The promise (or hope) that trade liberalization will enable countries
to spend more on environmental protection in the future, even if correct,
means that problems will worsen and solutions will be postponed until increased
wealth occurs from expanded trade and it trickles down to environmental
containment or cleanup. Needless to say, the hope that more money possibly
may be spent on environmental protection at some time in the future, with
market incentives encouraging environmentally harmful behavior in the mean-
time, offers little solace to environmentalists working for environmental so-
lutions today to problems that cannot wait. Instead, environmentalists often
are seeking government intervention or some other correction of market
incentives to curtail or lessen environmental harms caused by such market
externalities.
It is heartening that it is no longer just environmentalists who recognize
that the trade system must be adapted to ensure the viability of at least
some environmental measures. However, the GATT has demonstrated that
it is poorly suited to being the body that decides how trade and environ-
mental goals will be reconciled. After all, the GATT has as its objective
the promotion of international trade, without any corresponding mandate
to protect the environment or other competing goals. Thus, it is not
surprising that the GATT Secretariat has indicated that environmental
measures should rarely, if ever, be permitted to restrict trade.59 Moreover,
as discussed above, some of the most fundamental GATT rules preclude
many effective environmental regulations, and the GATT is unlikely to
support changes in these rules. Finally, the GATT processes of negotiation
and dispute settlement shut out proponents of the environmental side of
the trade and environment debate.
Nonetheless, the Uruguay Round is seeking to expand the impact of
the GATT on health and environmental standards. It is counterproductive
for the trade system to reach out to encompass more and more environ-
mental matters before the trade and environment debate is satisfactorily
resolved. By doing so, it is promising more heated clashes that undermine
its credibility.
The priorities and processes of the trade and environmental worlds clash
far too much for one to accept subservience to the other. Just as the trade
community wants to keep this debate within the trade system, so too the
environmental community is unwilling to place its stake in the trade world.
Before one system is subsumed within the other, the intersection between
trade and the environment must be fully explored and delineated.
It is simply unacceptable to assume the preeminence of the trade regime
and work toward piecemeal modifications of its terms. Such a scenario,
even with the meager adaptations suggested by Professor Jackson, would
offer too little too late to preserve existing, and promote future, environ-
mental regulations. Thus, GATT waivers for certain specified international
59. See generally GATT SECRETARIAT, supra note 1.
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environmental agreements (and possibly only for parts of them) would still
leave in place the obstacles to future agreements that are posed by the trade
system. Similarly, establishing minimum environmental regulations, the vi-
olation of which could form the basis of countervailing duties, fuels a
lowest common denominator approach that still penalizes countries with
more stringent environmental regulations. And of course, while these mod-
ifications are being developed, the trade system will be jeopardizing countless
health and environmental measures.
Neither proponents of the trade system nor environmental advocates
will trust solutions that are devised by a system that does not have as its
principal goals the promotion of their respective interests. This distrust is
compounded by the trade regime because the system denies environmental
advocates access to information about, and the right to participate in, the
development, interpretation, and implementation of its standards. .A mech-
anism must be developed that will ensure direct participation of all affected
interests. The OECD has recognized the importance of bringing together all
interested parties in its trade and environment discussions, which include
both trade and environmental governmental officials, as well as nongovern-
mental environmental organizations. 60 While it is essential to bring these
divergent interests together in- any resolution of the trade and environment
debate, the OECD cannot be the ultimate forum because it represents
developed countries only, and developing countries are, like environmental
advocates, unlikely to accord legitimacy to decisions reached in their absence.
The only viable way to proceed is to establish a neutral forum that has not
prejudged the issues and that has direct participation by both trade and
environmental governmental officials and nongovernmental organizations
60. OTA REPORT, supra note 49, at 19.
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